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NOTE
THE CASE AGAINST MANDATORY HIV
TESTING OF PREGNANT WOMEN:
THE LEGAL AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
EVANS MCMILLION
I.  INTRODUCTION
Few images arouse as much emotion as that of a sick child.  The desire to do
anything to help that child can be powerful and can cause people to take extreme
measures to make the child well, especially when the illness is a fatal one, like
AIDS.  Recent scientific studies have shown that treating HIV-positive mothers
during pregnancy can decrease the likelihood of transmission to the infant.
These findings, however, do not justify a policy that overrides the fundamental
legal rights and health care needs of women with HIV.  This Note examines the
public policy and legal ramifications of just such an extreme measure—the man-
datory HIV testing of pregnant women.
The following analytical framework is used to examine this problem.  First,
a short medical/statistical background provides a context for this discussion.
Second, the political, ethical, legal, and financial considerations unique to this is-
sue are examined.  Finally, the overall effectiveness of a mandatory testing pro-
gram for pregnant women is detailed.
II.  MEDICAL/STATISTICAL BACKGROUND:
THE FACE OF PREGNANT WOMEN WITH HIV
By contemporary estimates, about four million women give birth each year
in the United States.1  Approximately 7000 of those mothers are HIV-positive, the
majority of whom are women of color.2  Without intervention, approximately
1. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 74 tbl.89 (117th ed. 1997).
2. Approximately 76% of the women who have been diagnosed with AIDS are non-white.  See
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NO. 1,
HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT 1996 10 tbl.5 (1996); Centers for Disease Control & Prevention,
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Update: AIDS Among Women—United States, 1994, 44 MOR-
BIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 81, 82 (1995) [hereinafter Centers for Disease Control & Prevention,
Update]; Jennifer Cooper, The Politics of Pediatric AIDS, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 53, 53 n.6 (1996)
[hereinafter Cooper, Pediatric AIDS].
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twenty-six percent of these infants will become infected.3  By eighteen months of
age, however, most of these infants will have replaced their mother’s antibodies
with their own and the majority will then test HIV-negative without having re-
ceived treatment.4  The well-known 1994 study entitled the AIDS Clinical Trial
Group (ACTG) Protocol 076 (“076 Study”) showed that treating HIV-infected
pregnant women and their newborn infants with AZT reduced the perinatal
transmission rate of AIDS from around twenty-five percent to eight percent.5
These recent findings have caused an outpouring of support for mandatory
testing programs for all pregnant women and/or newborns6 from Congress, in
various state legislatures, and by the American Medical Association.  Anything
that decreases the incidence of transmission from mother to child appears, at
first glance, to be worth the risk of impinging upon the individual rights of
pregnant women.  When examined more closely, however, a mandatory testing
program is legally indefensible, financially undesirable, and ultimately ineffec-
tive in preventing the spread of HIV.
III.  POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Legislation that would mandate HIV testing for all pregnant women was
introduced recently in the New York State legislature7 and in Congress.8  Oppo-
nents of the proposals argue that mandatory testing is unconstitutional.  They
contend that regardless of whether the mother or the child is tested, the mother
is being informed of her HIV status without her consent, thus violating her pri-
3. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Update, supra note 2, at 82-83; see also Lynne
Langley, “Innocent Victims” Focus of AIDS Day, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Nov. 30, 1997, at
B1 (comparing vertical transmission rates in newborns who received AZT in utero to those who did
not).
4. See Anna Quindlen, The Baby Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1994, at A25 (showing that up to 80%
of these children will test negative); see also Nina Lowenstein, Mandatory Screening of Newborns For
HIV: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 43, 44 (1996).
5. See Elizabeth B. Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns Must
Fail: A  Legal, Historical, and Public Policy Analysis, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 13, 19 n.32 (1996)
[hereinafter Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing] (detailing the protocols of the 076 Study); see also
Laura Beil, AMA Backs HIV Test for Pregnant Women: Research Shows AZT Reduces the Risk of Fetuses
Contracting AIDS Virus, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 28, 1996, at 1A; Robin D. Gorsky et al., Pre-
venting Perinatal Transmission of HIV: Costs and Effectiveness of a Recommended Intervention, 3 PUB.
HEALTH REPS. 335, 336 (1996); infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
6. Some constituencies have advocated testing newborns and not the mother.  Testing a new-
born, however, only reliably reveals the HIV status of the mother.  Most infants born to HIV-positive
mothers initially test positive for HIV because of the in-utero exchange of antibodies.  Over time,
however, more than three out of four infants shed these maternal antibodies and replace them with
their own virus-free antibodies.  See Quindlen, supra note 4, at A25.
7. See Cooper, Pediatric AIDS, supra note 2, at 59 n.49 (discussing New York Assembly Bill No.
6747-B, which, if passed, would have required disclosure to the mother of a newborn confidential
HIV-related information that was discussed as a result of testing done on the child for any purpose).
8. The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency (CARE) Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300ff (1994), was amended recently to include a provision that eventually will require states to be-
gin a mandatory testing program for all newborns; non-compliant states will risk losing their general
funding under the Act, which is the bill that appropriates hundreds of millions of dollars each year
for AIDS programs.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-34 (West Supp. 1997).
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vacy rights and subjecting her to potential discrimination.9  Supporters of the
policy argue that if the 076 Study results are accurate, early identification of
HIV-positive mothers can reduce the likelihood of perinatal transmission and
save lives.10
Organizations such as the National Organization for Women (NOW) op-
pose mandatory testing,11 arguing that statutes requiring the testing of newborns
will force infants to be tested at the expense of the mother’s privacy rights and
lay the groundwork for recognition of fetal rights in opposition to the Supreme
Court’s holding in Roe v. Wade.12  Gay Men’s Health Crisis and the New York
Civil Liberties Union oppose mandatory testing because each fears that it will set
a precedent that erodes the statutory basis of confidentiality in one’s HIV
status.13  They are joined in their opposition by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), the U.S. Department of Public Health, and several doc-
tors’ organizations whose members work directly with pregnant women and
newborns.14
On the other side of the debate, the American Medical Association (AMA)
surprised the medical community and many of its members by reversing its pre-
vious position when it announced its support of mandatory testing of all preg-
nant women.15  The AMA represents about half of the nation’s doctors and is the
largest professional association in the medical profession and therefore can wield
tremendous influence on lawmakers and their public policy decisions.16  In addi-
tion to the AMA, the majority of the physicians on the Committee for the Care of
Children and Adolescents with HIV Infection support mandatory testing of
pregnant women.17  Finally, the Association to Benefit Children (ABC), a Man-
hattan-based advocacy group, actively supports mandatory testing.18  In April
1995, ABC filed suit against Governor George Pataki of New York to compel the
9. See Cooper, Pediatric AIDS, supra note 2, at 59.
10. See Beil, supra note 5, at 1A.
11. See John Leo, Babies Have Rights, Too, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 1, 1995, at 23
(contrasting the author’s support of a mandatory testing program with the views of organizations
like the National Organization for Women (NOW)).
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (refusing to recognize fundamental rights on the part of a pre-viable fe-
tus); see also Leo, supra note 11, at 23.
13. See Leo, supra note 11, at 23; see also James Dao, Mothers to Get AIDS Data Under Accord, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1995, at A1.
14. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., U.S.
Public Health Service Recommendations for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Counseling and Voluntary
Testing for Pregnant Women, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.: RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS,
July 7, 1995, at 1, 1-15.  The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American
Medical Association’s Council on Scientific Affairs, and the American Academy of Pediatrics oppose
mandatory testing.  See Beil, supra note 5, at 1A.
15. See Beil, supra note 5, at 1A (noting that the resolution passed the AMA’s board by only four
votes).
16. See id. (stating that although actions taken by the AMA are not legally binding, their rec-
ommendations can be a powerful influence on the lawmaking process).
17. See Cooper, Pediatric AIDS, supra note 2, at 60.  This organization also represents a large
number of pediatricians who work with AIDS patients.  See id.
18. See id.
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state to release the results of anonymous HIV tests that routinely are given to all
newborns by the CDC.19
At present, the tide among legislators is toward mandatory testing, and
given the explosive environment surrounding questions of reproductive rights, it
is likely that opposition arguments predicated on women’s autonomy in their
health care decisions will be hotly contested.  There are, however, exponential
external costs associated with mandating testing.20  It is likely that only when
these costs are felt in an already-overburdened public health system will budget-
minded lawmakers take notice.
IV.  ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The ethical issues presented by the mandatory testing of pregnant women
are troubling.  Pediatric AIDS is a particularly compelling target for government
intervention, primarily because children are perceived to be the most innocent
AIDS population given their political silence and vulnerability.21  Implementa-
tion of a mandatory testing program for pregnant women, however, results in
making the receipt of prenatal care contingent upon forced consent to an HIV
test.22
This raises some important ethical issues in the context of women’s health.
First, although testing pregnant women might prevent some transmissions,23
most doctors and public health officials who work directly with pregnant
women and newborns believe that mandatory testing would discourage the
women who need it most from seeking prenatal care.24  Given the demographics
of women with HIV that indicate that it is predominantly poor women of color
who traditionally have experienced coercion in reproductive decisions and diffi-
culty in gaining access to medical care, this concern might have important and
19. See Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 44.
20. See discussion infra Part VI.
21. See Kevin J. Curnin, Note, Newborn HIV Screening and New York Assembly Bill No. 6747-B:
Privacy and Equal Protection of Pregnant Women, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 857, 858 (1994) (arguing that
although well-intentioned, the New York bill requiring mandatory testing of newborns violates the
mother’s privacy and equal protection rights).
22. See Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing, supra note 5, at 26 (arguing that this type of pro-
gram establishes “a barrier requiring a pregnant woman to be tested as a pre-requisite for getting
health care, including prenatal care”).
23. See id. at 18-19 (stating that the 076 Study indicates that treating HIV-positive pregnant
women with AZT has the potential to reduce the vertical transmission rate by as much as 67%).
24. See Quindlen, supra note 4, at A25 (arguing that there is demonstrable proof that mandatory
counseling and voluntary testing programs generate a nearly 90% consent-to-test ratio without al-
ienating high-risk women from the health-care system); see also Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 50
(citing Dr. Helen Gayle, testifying for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention before the
Congressional Subcommittee on Health and Environment that “mandatory testing . . . may actually
reduce the chance that a woman and her baby will receive needed therapies if they are alienated
from the health care system” (citation omitted)).
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far-reaching implications.25  This is relevant particularly to undocumented immi-
grant women for whom a positive HIV test might be cause for deportation.26
Second, mandatory testing threatens to change the nature of the patient-
provider relationship by placing the provider in an enforcing, rather than facili-
tating, role.  A healthy patient-provider relationship is predicated on trust, and
many providers see the punitive nature of mandatory testing as counterproduc-
tive when dealing with high-risk populations who are already on the periphery
of the health care system.27  Similarly, in the reproductive context, an effective
health care provider must be able to furnish unbiased information and counsel-
ing to pregnant women about their options.  It is difficult, therefore, to establish
a patient-provider relationship predicated on trustworthiness and honesty when
the provider must force women to submit to a mandatory, government-imposed
HIV test.28
Third, a mandatory testing program results in the state placing itself be-
tween mother and child, implying that the state is a better caretaker than the
mother.29  This level of state intervention, and the message it sends, sets a dan-
gerous precedent for future government intrusions into the lives of women and
their children.30  Concerns over such intrusions, such as the fear of losing a child
to foster care or being prosecuted for transmitting HIV to a child, historically
have discouraged women from seeking care and services that otherwise would
be beneficial to them and their families. 31
Fourth, a mandatory testing program raises the issue of violence against
women.  Although more attenuated from the immediate policy discussion, the
impact that women’s fear of violence has on their decision to be tested has been
noted repeatedly.32  Since a large portion of HIV-positive women were infected
either from using intravenous (IV) drugs or by having sexual relations with
someone who does,33 decisions about disclosing their status to, or insisting on
risk-reduction behavior with, their drug-using partners are influenced by
women’s fear of a violent reaction.34  Similarly, if a woman was found to be HIV-
25. See Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 50.
26. See Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing, supra note 5, at 26 (analogizing that since testing
positive for HIV is grounds for barring non-citizen aliens from entering the United States, a positive
test result similarity may provide grounds for deportation).
27. See Beil, supra note 5, at 1A (referring to remarks of Victoria Thomas of the Pediatric AIDS
Foundation, Santa Monica, California).
28. See Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 50-51.
29. See Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing, supra note 5, at 26.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 26-27 (noting the concern that HIV-positive pregnant women might be prosecuted
for transmitting the disease in the same way that women have been charged with violating drug
statutes when their infants test positive for drug metabolites).
32. See Sharon Rae Jenkins & Helen L. Coons, Psychosocial Stress and Adaptation Processes for
Women Coping with HIV/AIDS, in WOMEN AND AIDS: COPING AND CARE 33, 54-55 (Ann O’Leary &
Loretta Sweet Jemmott eds., 1996); Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing, supra note 5, at 18.
33. See Dawn K. Smith  & Janet S. Moore, Epidemiology, Manifestations, and Treatment of HIV In-
fection in Women, in WOMEN AND AIDS, supra note 32, at 1, 4-5.
34. See Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing, supra note 5, at 18.
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positive and her partner was not,  “it’s a kind of forced revelation of infidelity, or
perceived infidelity,”35 and infidelity is the leading cause of domestic violence.36
Finally, the risks of treating a fetus with AZT are unknown.37  AZT “can
produce severe side effects, and [its] long term effects are still unknown.”38  The
question, thus, becomes one of “risk-benefit analysis.”  This analysis has both a
scientific component and a personal element: risks and benefits can be analyzed
based on observations, previous studies, and clinical experience.  A mother’s
values, however, also will affect how she weighs the various risks and benefits.39
If eighty percent of HIV-positive newborns are likely to test negative for the vi-
rus without any treatment, is subjecting the unborn-children of every mother
who tests HIV-positive to the unknown complications of AZT worth the risk?40
The issue, therefore, is whether the benefit accrued from testing mothers—
increasing non-infection rates through treatment—justifies overriding and in-
fringing the mother’s autonomy and family privacy.
V.  LEGAL CHALLENGES
The legal issues presented by a mandatory HIV testing program are par-
ticularly troubling,41 and most legal experts believe that such programs violate
women’s constitutional and statutory rights.42  Nonetheless, at least one legal
challenge already has been brought to compel states to institute mandatory test-
ing of pregnant women.43  This case was settled, but it set the stage for legislative
responses in Congress and the New York State legislature.44  Although several
legal arguments can be raised to challenge mandatory testing of pregnant
35. See Beil, supra note 5, at 1A (quoting Alta Charo, an associate professor of law and medical
ethics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison).
36. See id.
37. See Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing, supra note 5, at 19.
38. See Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 48-49.
39. See COMMITTEE ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN
IN CLINICAL STUDIES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH: ETHICAL AND LEGAL
ISSUES OF INCLUDING WOMEN IN CLINICAL STUDIES 191 (Anna C. Mastroianni et al. eds., 1994).
40. See Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 49 (stating that if “therapies are administered to all new-
borns testing positive for HIV from their mother’s antibodies, at least 75% of those infants will have
been exposed to the medications unnecessarily”).
41. Since any HIV test given to a newborn is essentially a non-consensual HIV test of the
mother, this Note addresses the legal aspects of mandatory testing programs of both groups to-
gether as mandatory HIV testing for pregnant women.
42. See generally Scott Burris, Testing, Disclosure, and the Right to Privacy, in AIDS LAW TODAY: A
NEW GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 115, 115-49 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993); Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV
Testing, supra note 5, at 22-25; Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 44-47.
43. See Julie D. Levinson, Note, While Ignorance May Not Be Bliss, It Is A Mother’s Right: Constitu-
tional Implications of Testing Newborn Babies For HIV, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 71, 74-75 n.23 (1996)
(citing Baby Girl Doe v. Pataki, No. 106661-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Apr. 25, 1995) (settled Oct. 12,
1995), where the Association to Benefit Children sued New York Governor George Pataki on behalf
of several infant plaintiffs to compel the state to disclose the results of otherwise anonymous HIV
tests routinely given to all newborns and to mandate HIV testing for all children born in New York
within 30 days of their birth); see also Dao, supra note 13, at A1.
44. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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women,45 this discussion will examine in depth only those brought under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
A.  The Fourth Amendment Right to Bodily Integrity
The Fourth Amendment protects individual privacy and the right to be free
from bodily intrusion by guaranteeing citizens the “right . . . to be secure in their
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures by government or its
agents.”46  In order for a government action to qualify as a search under the
Fourth Amendment, the person involved in the search must have an expectation
of privacy that society regards as reasonable.47  The Supreme Court has held that
a blood test is a search for the purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis.48  Since
HIV tests are administered by drawing blood, HIV screenings constitute
searches under the Fourth Amendment.49
In examining the reasonableness of a search, the Supreme Court has ruled
that courts must balance the government’s need to conduct the search against the
level of intrusion into the individual’s rights occasioned by the search.50  The
standard of reasonableness depends on the type of search, and government
searches fall within two distinct rubrics—criminal and administrative.  Criminal
searches occur when the government, acting in a law enforcement capacity, ob-
tains evidence to be used in a criminal proceeding.51  Such criminal searches are
deemed reasonable only when conducted pursuant to a warrant obtained
through a showing of probable cause.52  Administrative searches, however, in-
volve government activity to obtain evidence necessary to protect the public
45. See Burris, supra note 42, at 121-24 (examining state legislation regarding confidentiality,
disclosure, and consent); see generally Arthur S. Leonard, Discrimination, in AIDS LAW TODAY, supra
note 42, at 297, 297-318 (illustrating that federal issues, such as the right to be free from discrimina-
tion on the basis of a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, may be used as a chal-
lenge to mandatory AIDS testing).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
47. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (holding that a
person who goes into a telephone booth, closes the door, and deposits money to make a call main-
tains a reasonable expectation of privacy).
48. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“Such [blood] testing procedures
plainly constitute searches . . . within the meaning of . . . [the Fourth] Amendment.”).
49. See Virgin Islands v. Roberts, 756 F. Supp. 898, 901-04 (D.V.I. 1991) (holding that a noncon-
sensual intrusion into the body for blood is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment);
Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 686 F. Supp. 243, 250 (D. Neb. 1988)
(“Compulsory administration of a blood test ‘plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.’” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir.
1989).
50. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989) (holding that
the government interest in having drug testing for railroad employees outweighed individual pri-
vacy concerns); see also Linda Farber Post, Note, Unblinded Mandatory HIV Screening of Newborns:
Care or Coercion?, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 169, 206-13 (1994) (arguing that the mandatory HIV testing of
newborns infringes the Fourth Amendment rights of HIV-infected or at-risk individuals).
51. See Post, supra note 50, at 208.
52. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57 (holding that even though law enforcement officers might main-
tain reasonable suspicion, they are not authorized to search an individual without submitting evi-
dence of probable cause to a judicial officer and securing a search warrant).
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health and welfare as part of its larger regulatory function.53  These searches are
justifiable “whenever a reasonable government interest is justified by the
‘legislative or administrative standards’ governing the search.”54  Determining
the HIV status of pregnant women is not proposed as a means by which to ob-
tain evidence for criminal proceedings, but rather as a way to protect the public
health and welfare by preventing the spread of HIV to newborns and therefore
falls into the administrative search category.
In evaluating the legality of administrative searches, the Supreme Court has
recognized that these searches arise, almost by definition, in cases where the tra-
ditional warrant and probable cause requirements are impractical.55  This has led
to the development of the “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment
prohibition on unreasonable searches.56  The special needs exception is applied
narrowly “[i]n limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by
the search are minimal, and where an important government interest furthered
by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized
suspicion . . . .”57
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the privacy issues raised by HIV test-
ing, but has applied the special needs analysis in cases involving blood and urine
tests.  In 1989, twice in the same day, the Supreme Court held that in certain cir-
cumstances a showing of a compelling government interest in protecting the
public welfare could justify the application of the special needs exception to the
Fourth Amendment protections.  In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Associa-
tion,58 the Court found that passenger safety on trains was a sufficiently compel-
53. See Post, supra note 50, at 208.
54. Barbara Danko, Comment, The Fourth Amendment’s Challenge to Mandatory AIDS Testing of
Convicted Sexual Offenders—Has the AIDS Virus Attacked Our Constitutional Right to Privacy?, 4 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 279, 294 (1993) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)).
55. See Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 619 (allowing exceptions to Fourth Amend-
ment requirements when “‘special needs . . . make the warrant and probable-cause requirement im-
practicable’” (citations omitted)); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989) (same).  Initially recognized in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967), the Su-
preme Court has established that, counter to Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 373 (1959), administra-
tive searches such as criminal searches require judicial warrants, but has announced that exceptions
would be made in cases where the governmental interest outweighs an individual’s privacy intru-
sion, even if there is no individualized suspicion.  See Camara, 387 U.S. at 538-40; see also Danko, su-
pra note 54, at 298-300.  The application of this balancing test was broadened further in New York v.
Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), where the Court addressed the reasonableness of the search of an auto-
mobile junkyard without a warrant or probable cause.  See id. at 693.  In addressing this issue, the
Court set out a three-part test that, if satisfied, would justify a suspicionless, warrantless administra-
tive search.  See id. at 702-03.  To be found reasonable (1) the government must have a “substantial”
interest in the regulatory scheme under which the search is conducted; (2) such suspicionless
searches must be necessary to promote the regulatory scheme; and (3) the regulatory structure must
serve as a “constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.”  Burger, 482 U.S. at 703 (internal quo-
tations omitted); see also Danko, supra note 54, at 303-05.
56. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (permitting exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment requirements when special needs make showing probable cause and obtaining a war-
rant impracticable (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring))).
Once a court determines that a special need is present, it then applies the balancing test enunciated
in Camara.  See Danko, supra note 54, at 300.
57. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 624.
58. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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ling need to permit the compulsory testing of employees’ blood and urine for
traces of drugs following accidents and violations.59  In National Treasury Employ-
ees Union v. Von Raab,60 the Supreme Court found that the United States Customs
Services’ interest in ensuring that all employees applying for promotions to po-
sitions involving interdiction of illegal drugs or requiring the carrying of fire-
arms were fit and of high moral character outweighed the individual privacy
rights of the employees to work free of suspicionless drug testing.61  The Court in
these cases firmly established the precedent that in certain circumstances where
the court determines that the privacy interests invaded are minimal and that the
government’s compelling interest in promoting public welfare are beyond those
of normal law enforcement, the special needs exception will be applied.62
Once a court applies the special needs analysis, it proceeds with the afore-
mentioned balancing test, weighing the interest of the government in conducting
the search against the level of intrusion it occasions to determine whether the
government action violates the Fourth Amendment.63  It is likely that if a case in-
volving the mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women is brought, courts would
apply the special needs analysis, balancing the public health need to curb the
spread of AIDS and to obtain medical care for HIV-positive newborns against
the intrusion into the woman’s privacy.  The need to prevent the spread of HIV
is indeed important, but given the social stigma associated with being HIV-
positive, mandatory HIV testing represents an unnecessarily burdensome intru-
sion into the private lives of pregnant women.
The stigma associated with being HIV-positive has been well-documented;
testing positive has resulted in the loss of employment, insurance, housing, and
benefits.64  Similarly, only two groups of individuals must submit to mandatory
HIV-testing in the United States—prisoners and those charged with sex crimes.65
By forcing a woman to submit to a mandatory HIV-test simply because she has
chosen to exercise her constitutionally-protected fundamental right to become
pregnant66 is to suggest that the decision to have children results in such a di-
minished expectation of privacy as to compare only with the reduced rights of
prisoners and alleged sex offenders.
59. See id. (holding that the employees’ individual privacy rights were outweighed by the com-
pelling government interest in determining the cause of, and preventing, future train accidents,
thereby making warrantless and suspicionless drug and alcohol testing reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966) (applying the special
needs analysis in the criminal context for the first time when an individual hospitalized after an ar-
rest was compelled to undergo a blood test and finding that this search did not violate the individ-
ual’s Fourth Amendment rights).
60. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
61. See id. (applying the special needs analysis to urinalysis drug testing).
62. See Post, supra note 50, at 210.
63. See Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 634.
64. See John Douard & Jerry D. Durham, HIV-Infected Women and Children: Social and Ethical Per-
spectives, in WOMEN, CHILDREN, AND HIV/AIDS 228, 229-30 (Felissa L. Cohen & Jerry D. Durham
eds., 1993).
65. See Post, supra note 50, at 212 (citations omitted).
66. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942) (holding that the familial right to pro-
create is fundamental and therefore is protected by the Constitution).
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Given that the privacy interests implicated by a mandatory testing program
for pregnant women are far from “minimal,”67 the outcome of a case challenging
the mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women would depend on balancing
these interests against the government interest in preventing the spread of AIDS.
Preventing the spread of the HIV virus is indisputably important to public health
and welfare, but this goal likely can be accomplished without diminishing preg-
nant women’s privacy rights to the level of prisoners and alleged sex offenders.
Statistics have shown that when pregnant women are offered counseling about
the risks of transmitting AIDS to their children and the test results are guaran-
teed to be confidential and linked to available health care, ninety percent of
women will assent voluntarily to being tested for the virus.68  Preventing the
spread of AIDS is an important state interest, but the level of intrusion into
pregnant women’s lives occasioned by mandating an HIV test is overwhelming.
Given that the same goal can be achieved through a program of counseling and
voluntary testing without the intrusion of forced testing indicates that the bal-
ance should tilt toward protecting the individual liberties guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment.
B.  The Fourteenth Amendment Right to Privacy
Regardless of how the Court might articulate it, however, there is also a
constitutional right to privacy69 that is rooted in the doctrine of substantive due
process,70 a constitutional safeguard against state infringement of certain funda-
mental rights.71  The right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment has two
strands.  The first relates to confidentiality, or informational privacy implicated
in an “individual[‘s] interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters . . . .”72
67. See Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 624 (noting that for suspicionless searches to
pass constitutional muster, “the privacy interests implicated by the search [need to be] minimal”).
68. See Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing, supra note 5, at 22 (contrasting the discouraging
effects of mandatory testing with the success of voluntary testing and counseling).
69. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (holding that specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights create the penumbral right of privacy); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (arguing that there is a certain private realm that the state is
forbidden to enter); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (recognizing “that a right of personal pri-
vacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy” exists under the Constitution); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that the right to privacy is equivalent to the right of indi-
viduals to be free from unsolicited government intrusion into fundamentally personal matters such
as whether to bear children); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (holding that there is a fun-
damental right to be free “from unwarranted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy”).  Al-
though the Supreme Court consistently has articulated the existence of a constitutional right to pri-
vacy, the rulings supporting this proposition have made defining this right difficult.  See, e.g., Roe,
410 U.S. at 152 (writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun acknowledged the difficult line-drawing re-
sulting from this precedent, noting that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of
privacy.  In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps [to 1891], the Court has recognized that
a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution.”).
70. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-1, at 1302-04 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing the Court’s development of the substantive due process doctrine as encompassing the
right of privacy as a protected liberty interest).
71. See id.
72. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
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The second, more controversial strand is the right to decisional privacy, or
autonomy and “independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”73
A mandatory testing program of pregnant women would invoke not only confi-
dentiality issues, but also autonomy issues by affecting a woman’s decision-
making ability regarding her reproductive options.  Most analysis of mandatory
HIV testing has focused on confidentiality; consequently, the following analysis
focuses on the autonomy strand, illustrating that a testing scheme based on a
woman’s decision to give birth implicitly burdens her autonomous decision-
making right.74
Only those rights that are considered fundamental are guaranteed by the
constitutional substantive due process right of individual privacy.75  These fun-
damental rights are separated into isolated “zones of privacy”76 that include,
among others, marriage,77 procreation,78 contraception,79 and family life.80  Gov-
73. Id. at 599-600.
74. For an analysis of the confidentiality strand of the right to privacy in this area, see Roger
Doughty, The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information: Responding to the Resurgence of Aggressive
Public Health Interventions in the AIDS Epidemic, 82 CAL. L. REV. 113, 148-54 (1994) (arguing that the
legal protections against disclosure of confidential HIV-related information are inadequate and do
not strike the appropriate balance between protecting individual rights and promoting public
health); Gretta J. Heanney, The Constitutional Right of Informational Privacy: Does It Protect Children
Suffering from AIDS?, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 927, 929-46, 965-66 (1986) (arguing that HIV-infected
children have a constitutional right of informational privacy that would make disclosure of their
serostatus to any school official, other than those who provide health care, constitutionally imper-
missible).
75. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (holding that
the Connecticut statute in question infringes the Due Process Clause because it “violates basic values
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’” (citation omitted)).
76. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); see also Curnin, supra note 21, at 896-97 (listing the
recognized “zones of privacy”).
77. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).  But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-
96 (1986) (holding that the Constitution does not confer upon homosexuals the fundamental right to
engage in private sexual acts).
78. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).  Mandatory testing unlawfully discrimi-
nates on the basis of gender because of the unique biological reality of pregnancy, and could give
rise to a cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Statutory
classifications based on gender typically are evaluated by courts under intermediate scrutiny, which
requires that “classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
Even though only women can become pregnant, the Supreme Court has refused to hold that preg-
nancy-based statutes are gender-based classifications.  See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-97
(1974) (holding that a California disability insurance program that excludes from coverage a disabil-
ity resulting from normal pregnancy does not discriminate against any definable group or class in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause).  Despite the Court’s rulings that attempt to disassociate
gender from pregnancy for the purpose of determining the constitutionality of statutes, mandatory
HIV testing of pregnant women might still be unconstitutional if the discriminatory nature of testing
can be characterized as a gender-based deprivation of women’s liberty interest as distinct from the
issue of pregnancy.  See City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (holding that a pen-
sion plan requiring women to make larger contributions than men because of their longer life expec-
tancy discriminates against women by treating them “‘in a manner which but for [her] sex would
[have been] different’” (citation omitted)).
79. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (holding that the right to use contraceptives falls “within the
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees”).
MCMILLION 06/10/98  10:15 AM
238 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 5:227 1998
ernment action that impinges autonomy within any of these zones triggers the
most rigorous judicial review, strict scrutiny.81  Strict scrutiny requires that any
governmental act treading upon a fundamental right must serve a compelling
interest and must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.82
Application of the traditional strict scrutiny analysis in this setting, how-
ever, would depend on a court’s interpretation of the recent Supreme Court case
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,83 which altered the land-
scape in this area.  Like Roe v. Wade,84 the seminal abortion rights case, Casey im-
plicated the reproductive rights zone of privacy.85  The Court in Casey, however,
did not apply strict scrutiny as it had in Roe, but instead applied the “undue
burden” test86 formulated in earlier decisions.87  The undue burden analysis is a
balancing test that weighs personal liberty against an important state interest
and asks whether the government action places a “substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion”88 of a pre-viable fetus.  The application
and scope of this new analysis has yet to be determined.  The undue burden test
might apply only to legislation restricting abortion.89  It is possible, however, that
the undue burden analysis may become a “new, more flexible standard by which
any interference with individual autonomy is measured.”90  Under either analy-
sis, however, a mandatory HIV testing program for pregnant women likely
would be found unconstitutional.
Under the strict scrutiny test, which mandates that a compelling state inter-
est be achieved through narrowly tailored means,91 at least two protected zones
of privacy would be infringed upon by legislation mandating the testing of
80. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (holding that the sanctity of
family life is a fundamental right).
81. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.  Although the term “strict scrutiny” most commonly is associ-
ated with equal protection jurisprudence, the same language is used in cases addressing substantive
due process protections when the right infringed is determined to be a fundamental substantive due
process right.  See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 503-04 (White, J., concurring).
82. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 154-55 (holding that the right to personal privacy, which includes a
limited right to obtain an abortion, is a fundamental right and can only be impinged in the face of a
narrowly tailored statute that protects a compelling state interest); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
83. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
84. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
85. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852-53.
86. See id. at 876 (“In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of recon-
ciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”).
87. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (discussing the “unduly burdensome” standard); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74
(1977) (same).
88. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
89. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88
NW. U. L. REV. 641, 687 (1994) (noting that the lower courts will apply the undue burden test to
abortion regulations); Kathryn Kolbert & David H. Gans, Responding to Planned Parenthood v. Ca-
sey: Establishing Neutrality Principles in State Constitutional Law, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1155 (1993)
(noting that “the burden of proof now faced by challengers of abortion restrictions is weightier” than
it was under Roe (emphasis added)).
90. Curnin, supra note 21, at 898, 898 n.235.
91. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
MCMILLION 06/10/98  10:15 AM
THE CASE AGAINST MANDATORY HIV TESTING 239
pregnant women—procreation92 and family life.93  Such a government program
likely would fail strict scrutiny analysis because, even assuming a compelling
government interest in early detection and treatment of newborns who are at
high risk for being HIV-positive, there is an alternative means that is tailored
more narrowly to achieve the state’s purpose.  Mandatory counseling, coupled
with voluntary testing, avoids the privacy invasion associated with mandatory
testing and many of the other built-in obstacles—discouraging women from
seeking prenatal care and failure to guarantee follow up care—and directly ef-
fectuates the state’s interest in testing large numbers of women and entering in-
fected newborns into treatment.94
It also is difficult to argue that a mandatory screening program is narrowly
tailored when in practice it is overinclusive.  The Court has stated that statistical
analysis can provide an illustrative tool for analysis,95 and the numbers do not
justify universal testing of pregnant women.  There are less than 2000 children
born HIV-positive in the United States annually,96 and yet a mandatory testing
program would result in the testing of all of the nearly four million women who
give birth across the nation each year.97  This reality presents a stark statistical
imbalance: all of the women who give birth in hospitals and medical care facili-
ties in the United States would be subjected to the substantial intrusion into their
constitutionally protected autonomy to guard against a risk found in less than
one percent of the population.  This disproportionate statistical reality, especially
when contrasted with the efficacy of a counseling and voluntary testing pro-
gram,98 illustrates that a mandatory testing program for all pregnant women may
be overinclusive and may not be narrowly tailored to fit the state’s interest,
thereby failing strict scrutiny.
A mandatory HIV testing program for pregnant women also likely fails the
undue burden test.  Under a broad reading of Casey, the undue burden test will
be applied to any government regulation that imposes an undue burden on a
constitutionally protected zone of privacy.99  A statute affecting one of these
zones would be unconstitutional only if it created an undue burden or a
“substantial obstacle” between an individual and the protected zone of privacy
in which she chooses to exercise her autonomy.100  Since Casey provides the most
contemporary analysis of the undue burden test, the outcome of a challenge to a
92. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that the right to procreate is a fun-
damental right).
93. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (holding that “the Constitution
protects the sanctity of the family”); see also Curnin, supra note 21, at 899.
94. See Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing, supra note 5, at 22.
95. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200-04 (1976) (holding that statistical analysis can help to
prove the unconstitutionality of a gender classification).
96. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
98. See Curnin, supra note 21, at 921 (arguing that the results of the New York State HIV Sero-
prevalence Project show that after six years of demographic testing the state knows exactly where
the HIV infection rates are the highest and who is most at risk for transmission).
99. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
100. See id. at 877.
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mandatory testing program will depend on the way in which the Court applies
this fact-intensive test.
If the Court applies the undue burden test to the statute in the same way it
applied the test to the twenty-four hour waiting period in Casey,101 a mandatory
testing program might be found to be constitutional.  By stressing the benefits
and de-emphasizing the burdens, the Court found that the statute did not con-
stitute a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion.102  The Court acknowl-
edged that such a waiting period would burden most the women with the fewest
resources, the farthest to travel, and the most difficulty explaining their absences
to spouses and employers.103  The Court nonetheless determined that the re-
quirement created an important opportunity to make a more informed and de-
liberate choice that did not increase a woman’s health risk.104  The Court con-
cluded that the twenty-four hour waiting period did not make the right to
choose too difficult, announcing that “[a] particular burden is not of necessity a
substantial obstacle.”105
In contrast, if the Court applied a narrow reading of Casey, as in its analysis
of the spousal notification requirement,106 an HIV testing program might be seen
as overly burdensome and thus unconstitutional.107  By minimizing the benefits
and stressing the burdens of a spousal notification requirement, the Court went
to great lengths108 to point out that since there was no exemption from the re-
quirement for women who experienced domestic abuse, and because of the
“millions of women in this country who are the victims of regular physical and
psychological abuse at the hands of their husbands,”109 the provision was “likely
to prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an abortion.”110  If the
Court were to apply this narrower reading of Casey, a mandatory testing pro-
gram likely would be struck down.
Under a program of mandatory testing for pregnant women, every woman
giving birth in a hospital or health care facility would be tested for HIV and
therefore would be given no choice as to how and when she chooses to confront
101. See id. at 885-87 (examining the constitutionality of an element of the Pennsylvania abortion
statute that required a physician to inform patients of the health risks of an abortion for both the
mother and the fetus 24 hours before the procedure and to provide materials published by the state
characterizing the fetus and listing the agencies that assist with adoption and child welfare services).
102. See id. at 887.
103. See id. at 885-86.
104. See id. (holding that in light of the medical emergency exemption, the 24-hour wait did not
create a health risk).
105. Id. at 887.
106. See id. at 887-98 (invalidating an element of a Pennsylvania abortion statute that requires a
physician to refrain from performing an abortion on a married woman unless she presents a signed
statement certifying that she has informed her husband that she is about to undergo an abortion; if
the procedure is performed without such a statement, the doctor will lose her license and be liable to
the husband for damages).
107. See id.
108. See id. at 888-93 (stepping beyond the factual record to introduce studies to support the
lower court’s findings that fear of domestic abuse would discourage women from notifying their
husbands).
109. Id. at 893.
110. Id.
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her HIV status.  Considering the fatal diagnosis that awaits a positive test result
and the profound discrimination that confronts those with AIDS, it is not un-
thinkable that a woman would choose not to know her HIV status.  A mandatory
testing program denies this choice to pregnant women merely because they have
chosen to give birth, creating a substantial obstacle to deciding when and how to
bear a child.  In addition, for the women most at risk for HIV infection, this type
of forced confrontation in a health care setting can cause women to avoid pre-
natal care rather than risk being exposed,111 a result that poses serious health
risks for both the mother and the child.  Any program that discourages women
from seeking prenatal care poses an undue burden on pregnant women’s
autonomous reproduction decisions because it affects not only their decisions
about whether to have children, but when and where to have them.  These nega-
tive consequences illustrate that legislation that forces pregnant women to con-
front their HIV status and the possible infection of their newborns constitutes a
“substantial obstacle,” and therefore an undue burden on the exercise of their
autonomy in their constitutionally protected zones of privacy.
VI.  FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Public health reports estimate that the cost savings resulting from the im-
plementation of a comprehensive HIV counseling and voluntary testing program
of pregnant women would prevent approximately 656 perinatal transmissions,
with a resulting cost savings of $105.6 million.112  If these medical cost savings are
subtracted from the costs of implementing the counseling and testing programs,
the net savings is $38.1 million.113  Similar estimates of the cost savings of a man-
datory testing program have not been reported by the U.S. Department of Public
Health, but with the consent-to-test rate so high,114 it is realistic to assume that the
savings would be of a similar magnitude.
In a mandatory program, however, there are external costs not present in
the voluntary counseling context that must be taken into account when compar-
ing the financial efficiency of the two programs.  First, significant funds are likely
to be wasted on unnecessary tests in a mandatory testing program.  Counseling
and screening procedures reveal that many women are at such low risk levels
that they should be exempt from testing; a mandatory regime would test such
women unnecessarily and at great cost to the state.  There are over four million
live births in the United States annually.115  The cost to administer an HIV test to
all of these women, when only 7000 of them are HIV-positive,116 would be astro-
111. See Curnin, supra note 21, at 881-82.
112. See Gorsky et al., supra note 5, at 338.
113. See id. at 339.  This is a conservative estimate.  Gorsky et al. note that “[f]or the United
States, with a maternal HIV seroprevalence of 1.71 per 1000 births, the cost-savings of the interven-
tion [counseling and voluntary testing] ranged from $24.9 million to $93.5 million . . . .”  Id.
114. See Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing, supra note 5, at 22 (showing that when pregnant
women are offered counseling about the risks of transmitting AIDS to their children and the test re-
sults are guaranteed to remain confidential, nearly 90% of women volunteer for HIV testing); see also
discussion infra Part VII (describing the effectiveness of mandatory HIV testing programs).
115. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1, at 74 tbl.89.
116. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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nomical.  This is highly inefficient when nearly the same effectiveness could be
achieved through a voluntary testing program without these excess costs. 117
Second, although often forgotten in this debate, the most important factor in
a newborn’s health care is the mother,118 which is why women’s health care pro-
viders and public health officials support voluntary testing.119  Health officials
believe that mandatory testing will drive women away from the health care sys-
tem and discourage them from seeking prenatal care.120  The external costs to so-
ciety of these infants born without prenatal care likely will be greater in the long
run than the costs of preventative prenatal care.
Finally, testing pregnant women, either through mandatory or voluntary
programs, represents only limited costs savings because such a program applies
only after the infection and the pregnancy already have occurred.  The greatest
costs savings would be realized if the initial infection could be prevented by de-
termining the HIV status of the mother before she becomes pregnant.  This type
of initiative likely would increase the mother’s reproductive options and result
in fewer children abandoned in hospitals after birth.121  A better way to realize
these goals would be to combine the funds saved through an aggressive coun-
seling and voluntary testing program with those saved from avoiding adminis-
tering the test on a mandatory basis to very low-risk women and direct this
money toward pre-exposure prevention efforts.  Education and counseling pro-
grams are the most efficient ways to prevent the spread of HIV to women and
therefore are the most effective way to prevent pregnant women from infecting
their newborns.
VII.  EFFECTIVENESS OF A MANDATORY HIV TESTING PROGRAM
Mandatory testing programs frighten away the very people most at risk,
and thus render these programs ineffective.  For example, in Illinois, during the
two years in which the state required mandatory HIV testing for all those ap-
plying for marriage licenses, approximately 40,000 people left the state to get
married elsewhere.122  In addition, in New York City there was a dramatic in-
crease in newborns abandoned at the hospital when city officials were given the
authority to initiate foster care proceedings against women who tested positive
for drug use.123  Finally, disproportionately high rates of anonymous HIV testing
117. Research shows that 90% of women agree to be tested once they have been counseled by
their doctor.  See Quindlen, supra note 4, at A25; see also discussion infra Part VII (discussing the ef-
fectiveness of mandatory HIV testing).
118. See Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing, supra note 5, at 27.
119. This approach has been endorsed by the American Nurses Association, American Academy
of Pediatrics, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American Public Health Asso-
ciation, the Institute of Medicine, and the CDC.  See Beil, supra note 5, at 1A; Cooper, Why Mandatory
HIV Testing, supra note 5, at 27 n.78.
120. See Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing, supra note 5, at 21-22.
121. See id. (arguing that a New York law that required newborns to be screened for drug me-
tabolites at birth resulted in a significant increase in the number of babies abandoned at the hospital
because when a newborn’s test was positive, the state automatically could initiate proceedings
against the mother).
122. See id. at 21.
123. See id. at 21-22.
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are recorded across the borders of states that mandate reporting of all of those
who test positive for HIV.124
In addition, mandatory testing of pregnant women is unlikely to reduce the
spread of HIV because groups at high risk for HIV historically have had very
limited access to medical care and treatment.125  All AIDS-related programs
therefore must be sensitive to issues of socio-economics, class, race, and most
importantly, access, in order to be effective.
By contrast, however, when pre-test counseling is offered in the prenatal
settings and is linked to voluntary testing and access to care and treatment, ap-
proximately ninety percent of pregnant women consent to counseling.126  For ex-
ample, at the Harlem Hospital in New York City, the consent-to-test rate with a
voluntary testing program is approximately ninety percent.127  Similar statistics
are reported at Cook County Hospital (Chicago), Johns Hopkins (Baltimore),
Grady Hospital (Atlanta), and other sites in California and Puerto Rico.128  The
majority of the populations served in these locations are poor women of color
who have been perceived traditionally as difficult patients, yet the consent-to-
test rates and numbers of women brought into care in those locations are high.129
The conclusion is that voluntary programs work among women infected with
HIV.  Mandatory programs, on the other hand, threaten to create downstream
costs and problems by discouraging women from seeking medical care.
Any benefits to be realized from a testing program depend upon the con-
tinued cooperation and involvement of the mother.  The complexity of the deci-
sionmaking and monitoring of the child require the voluntary participation of a
mother who trusts her health care provider and wants to be a part of a system
that responds to her needs.  HIV testing “is likely to be most successful if it be-
gins with an informed patient and a trusted provider.  Voluntary testing accom-
plishes this; mandatory testing . . . may actually reduce the chance that a woman
and her baby will receive needed therapies if they are alienated from the health
care system.”130  It is unlikely, therefore, that mandatory testing will be effective
in facilitating the relationship of continued cooperation between the mother and
her provider necessary to allow her newborn to benefit from early diagnosis.
Finally, instituting a mandatory HIV testing program does not ensure that
those who test positive will have access to treatment and care.  Although early
identification of HIV infection is important, without providing access to pro-
phylactic treatments to those newborns at risk, mandatory testing is ineffective.
For example, a recent study showed that out of twenty-nine infants in New York
City identified as at risk for HIV, twenty-two did not receive prophylactic drug
treatments.131  Given the demographics of HIV-positive pregnant women, many
124. See id. at 22.
125. See Post, supra note 50, at 181.
126. See Quindlen, supra note 4, at A25.
127. See id.
128. See Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing, supra note 5, at 22.
129. See id.
130. Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 50 (quoting Dr. Helen Gayle, testifying for the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention before the congressional Subcommittee on Health and Environment,
May 1995 (citation omitted)).
131. See Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing, supra note 5, at 27 n.79 (quotations omitted).
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of those in need will receive assistance through federal and state government
programs.132  New welfare legislation, however, would cut funding for many
women who would have been eligible to receive expensive prophylactic treat-
ments.  These women are forced to seek assistance elsewhere from an increas-
ingly overburdened public health system.  If the purpose of instituting a man-
datory testing program is to diagnose the mother early so that new drug
therapies can be employed to decrease the chances of transmission to her child,133
the effectiveness of such a program is questionable when access to these
“miracle” drugs may be limited, if not impossible.
VIII.  CONCLUSION
Supporters of mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women argue that the
need to identify and bring into treatment as many HIV-positive newborns and
mothers as possible is worth infringing upon the constitutionally protected rights
of the mother.  Mandatory testing focuses only on the identification element,
however, and is an unsatisfactory and potentially counterproductive substitute
for substantive programs.  By contrast, programs combining aggressive and
comprehensive prenatal counseling lead to high percentages of women who
comprehend the importance of learning their HIV status voluntarily submitting
to an HIV test.134
The most legally defensible policy, the one most respectful of women’s
autonomy, and the one with the least undesirable consequences is a voluntary
testing program that (1) counsels women in high-risk groups to make the appro-
priate decisions regarding their own health care and that of their fetus; (2) caters
the counseling materials to fit the demographics of the population served; (3)
mandates pre- and post-test counseling; (4) requires that voluntary prenatal
testing occur only after pre-test counseling; and (5) secures funding and access to
AZT and other AIDS therapies for pregnant women and their children.
Legislators remain unaware of many of the realities facing HIV-infected
pregnant women and their providers.  Any legislation in this area must protect
the rights of both mothers and children.  It is only by winning the trust and co-
operation of pregnant women, not coercing them, that real change in perinatal
HIV-transmission rates can occur.
132. Cf. Laurence Lavin, AIDS, Medicaid, and Women, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 193, 198-207
(1998) (discussing the way in which the recent changes in the welfare laws impact women with HIV
who receive Medicaid); Katherine Marconi et al., The Paradigm Shift in Medicaid: Women with HIV
Under Managed Care, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 211, 212-21 (1998) (discussing issues facing HIV-
positive women who receive Medicaid as health care provision shifts from a fee-for-service system
to managed care).
133. It is noteworthy that the dramatically reduced transmission rates shown in the 076 study
are not expected to be equaled when women face “tangible concerns not present” in the clinical trial
context, such as the challenge of overcoming limited access to health and prenatal care.  See Lowen-
stein, supra note 4, at 19.
134. See Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing, supra note 5, at 22.
